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THE RADICAL FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF SEX
AND REASON
Richard A. Posner*
INTRODUCTION

T

HE three commentaries on Sex and Reason' to which the editors
of the Review have invited me to respond are written from a selfidentified feminist standpoint, as is a fourth, similar in many respects,
published in the Harvard Law Review. 2 There are significant differences in tone and approach among the papers, but they are recognizably of a type. I hesitate to call the type feminist, because that would
make of feminism a sectarian, carelessly reasoned, and faintly nasty,
enterprise, enunciating radical dogma in the guise of combating stereotypes, overlooking convergence of ends in order to impose an orthodoxy
of means, ascribing disagreement to gender. Properly understood, feminism as a branch of learning is the study of women in society, with
emphasis on the effects on them of social practices and public policies,
with due regard for what women themselves (often long ignored) have
said or say, with sincere concern for women's welfare, and with a heavy
dose of skepticism about theories of a theocratic or otherwise dogmatic
cast that teach that women are predestined to be subordinate to men.
On this construal of feminism, John Stuart Mill is a feminist as well as
Catharine MacKinnon; Mary Wollstonecraft as well as Andrea Dwor* Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago
Law School. I thank Katharine Bartlett, Lawrence Lessig, Martha Nussbaum, Charlene Posner.
and Cass Sunstein for many helpful comments on a previous draft of this paper, and Benjamin
Aller for valuable research assistance.

1. RICHARD A. POSNER. SEX AND REASON (1992).
2. Gillian K. Hadfield, Flirtingwith Science: Richard Posner on the Bloeconomics of Sexual
Man, 106 HARv. L. REV. 479 (1992) (book review). In view of the similarity, I shall take this
opportunity to reply to Professor Hadfield as well.
3. The papers variously describe my book as "harmful and dangerous," "thoroughly muddled," "potentially oppressive," "misogynistic," "smug," "pat," "simplistic," "formulaic: "merely
a rehearsal" of "superficial," "insipid stereotypes," and, of course, "male-centered." Professor
Hadfield's surreply, Gillian K. Hadfield, Not the "Radical"Feminist Critiqueof Sex and Reason.
25 CONN. L. REV. 533 (1993), adds a few more choice epithets.
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kin; Martha Nussbaum as well as Martha Fineman. On this construal,
rejection of biological and economic science, rejection of the evidence
of one's senses, a left-wing vocabulary thick with words like "patriarchal," "hegemonic," "colonizing," and "classism," and dislike of men
coupled with suspicion of heterosexuality are adventitious rather than
organic characteristics of feminism; they reflect the temporary dominance of radical feminism in the academy. On this construal, MacKin4
non's equation of radical feminism to feminism is wrong.
Although critical of the tone, politics, general thrust, and many
details of the four5 critiques of my book, I am nevertheless grateful for
them. They identify and illuminate flaws in my treatment of female
sexuality and therefore will be valuable to future researchers.
THE AIMS OF

Sex and Reason

It would be presumptuous to assume that every reader of this exchange has read Sex and Reason. I cannot reproduce the argument of
the book in the compass of this brief reply, but I can say something
about the aims and structure of the work that may help readers to
orient themselves. Partly for the education of myself and my colleagues
in the judicial profession-for we are called upon more and more to
decide cases involving sexual conduct-and partly out of a long-standing academic interest in the economics of nonmarket behavior, I set out
to write a broad general work on human sexual practices and norms
(legal and moral), unified around the theme that sexual behavior is
rational in the economist's sense. Given the breadth of the intended
work and the fact that there had been little previous economic writing
on sex, I could not hope-quite apart from the limitations of my own
competence-to accomplish the complete and definitive analysis of the
economics of sexuality. I hoped to be able to show that a simple economic model could explain differences and similarities of sexual behavior and norms across different cultures and epochs and also could gen4. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DiscouRsEs ON LIFE AND LAW 137
(1987); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 833 &

n.8 (1990). Which is not to suggest that radical feminist thought is a monolith, see. e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, MacKinnon's Feminism: Power on Whose Terms?, 75 CAL L. REV. 1559 (1987)

(book review), that all works of radical feminism have all the characteristics that I have listed (it
is rather that such works bear a family resemblance, in Wittgenstein's useful sense), or that no
radical feminists have made significant contributions to the study of sexuality. Apart from MacKinnon's well-known work, see, e.g., Ruthann Robson, Lesbianism in Anglo-European Legal History, 5 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1990).
5.

Five, with Hadfield's surreply, supra note 3.
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erate new, counterintuitive, testable hypotheses concerning the
incidence of different types of sexual behavior. The model viewed sexual behavior as the consequence of rational choices made in light of the
relevant costs, including search, expected punishment, fertility, and disease costs, and in light of benefits heavily influenced by innate or otherwise unshakable sexual preferences, for example, for same-sex relations
or variety in sexual partners. I did not wish to be dogmatically insistent, however, that economics was the key that would unlock the
secrets of human sexuality. I recognized the dependence of an economic theory of sexuality on the descriptive and analytical work of psychologists, historians, and sociologists, including specialists in women's
and gay studies. I was also interested in what biology could contribute
to an understanding not only of the physiological properties of human
sexuality but also of the social dimensions, including differences between male and female sexual behavior and the preference of some
men and women for homosexual relations. I wanted to compare scientific and social scientific approaches to sexuality with the moral theories that have been so influential in shaping mores and public policy.
And I wanted to evaluate judicial performance in dealing with such
issues of policy as what (if anything) to do about homosexual sodomy,
surrogate motherhood, abortion, marital rape, pornography, and nude
dancing.
The result is a long book, and an eclectic one, though economics
occupies center stage. The vastness of my canvas prevents the work
from being exhaustive, although some readers may find it exhausting. I
discuss the history of "sexology," the evolution of sexual mores from
the ancient Near East to the present, the causes and incidence of male
and female homosexuality, the effects and political economy of sex
laws, the Supreme Court's sexual and reproductive decisions, monogamy and polygamy, adoption and artificial reproduction, eugenics and
population policy, pornography and erotic art, divorce, prostitution, discrimination against homosexuals, abortion and contraception, racial
differences in sexual behavior, marital and nonmarital rape, child sexual abuse, transvestism, the "social construction" of sex, the changing
role of women, the Swedish experiment in sexual egalitarianism, and
other topics besides. Although the emphasis is descriptive and explanatory-hence positive rather than normative-I also offer views on a
number of normative issues. The orientation that generates these views
is libertarian, in the sense in which that word could be used to describe
the political philosophy of John Stuart Mill. I argue that adults (gener-
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ously defined to include much of the teenage population) should be free
to engage in consensual sexual relations and related conduct (such as
the consumption of pornography and the formation and enforcement of
surrogate-motherhood arrangements) unless there are palpably adverse
consequences for nonconsenting third parties. I argue that government
should encourage the provision of information that enables people to
minimize the adverse consequences of sex-information about contraception, for example, in order to minimize the incidence of abortions
and unwanted births.
A book of such wide scope, dealing with so controversial and emotional a subject, and one on which firm data are so difficult to come by,
is sure to contain errors (one of which I acknowledge in this reply) and
omissions, misplaced emphases, manifestations of bias and insensitivity,
incomplete logic, and warps reflecting the limitations of the author's
personal experience and the quirks of his psychology. Aligned with
none of the vocal schools of sexual theorizing-not the Foucauldian
constructionist, nor the radical feminist, nor the Thomist, nor the neoconservative, nor the paleoconservative, nor the Marcusan, nor the gay
and lesbian liberationist-but with a branch of economics, the economics of nonmarket behavior, that is controversial even within the economics profession and detested as "imperialistic" by most other social
scientists, and with an even more controversial branch of evolutionary
biology-sociobiology, the application of Darwinian principles to social
behavior-and with a school of ethical philosophy, associated with Mill
and other "soft" post-Benthamite utilitarians, which is generally considered unrigorous and pass6-a work such as Sex and Reason is
bound to be as irresistible a target for criticisms as St. Sebastian was
for arrows. I am braced for the volley. Students of hagiography will
recall that St. Sebastian survived the arrows.
THE CRITICS

Fineman
Two of the four authors (Fineman and Robson) refuse to engage
with my analysis. Fineman begins by saying that I seek to marginalize
the family and to push aside the sexual aspects of traditional marriage.
She got this idea because I said that the economic literature on the
family had largely ignored sex. But I also said that it is an oversight
that I set out to rectify. In fact, marriage, divorce, marital sex, procreation, adoption, and many other topics that involve the family are discussed at length in the book. Fineman claims that I brush aside not
HeinOnline -- 25 Conn. L. Rev. 518 1992-1993
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only the family, but also moral theories of sex. On the contrary, I explained that those theories, as the principal rivals to social scientific
theories of sexuality such as.the economic or bioeconomic theory that
the book advances, deserve most serious consideration. They are the
focus of Chapters Eight and Ten of the book. Bartlett's paper touches
on my treatment of them-briefly, but enough to give the flavor.
Having misdescribed the book, Fineman throws up her hands because she finds it permeated by distortion and bias, by inaccurate, stereotypical, and questionable statements, by a smug and assertive tone,
and by a pretense to definitiveness and uniqueness. She gives few particulars, and those primarily concern one chapter of the book, the chapter on the biology-not the economics--of sex.0 One of my claims is
that lesbian couples have intercourse less frequently on average than
heterosexual couples, who in turn have intercourse less frequently on
average than male homosexual couples. She doesn't contend that this is
false-and would hardly be likely to do so, because it is a point made
by the scholars whom Professor Robson cites as authorities on lesbian
sexuality--only that it contains buried assumptions about the meaning
of intercourse and its relation to other forms of sexual expression. That
is a fair point, and one that I had overlooked; but if for intercourse we
substitute number of sexual acts in which at least one of the partners
has an orgasm," the relation that I posit between frequency of sexual
activity and the presence of a male would still hold. Were it replied
that the orgasm is less central to the female than to the male expression of erotic feeling, 9 I would consider this a confirmation of the basic
biological point, that the male sex drive is on average stronger than the
female. I never suggested that women love less intensely than men. But
if orgasmic activity is a less characteristic, urgent, desired, and fre6.

Martha Albertson Fineman, The Hermeneutics of Reason: A Commentary on Sex and

Reason, 25 CoNN. L. REv. 503, 506 n.16 (1993).
7. LILLIAN FADERMAN. ODD GIRLS AND TWILIGHT LOVERS. A HISTORY OF LESBIAN LIFE IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 248 (1991) ("lesbians tend to have less sex than hetercsexuals or
gay men"); Marilyn Frye, Lesbian "Sex." in Lesbian Philosophiesand Cultures 305, 313 (Jeffner
Allen ed., 1990) (lesbian relationships tend to be "relationships in which there is a lowish frequency of clearly delineated desires and direct initiations of satisfactions"). See also Faderman,
supra, at 246-48, 254.

8. Though perhaps not sheer number of orgasms, since women, unlike men, are physically
capable of multiple orgasms in close, almost immediate, succession. Robson suggests that lesbian
intercourse frequently is multi-orgasmic. Ruthann Robson, Posner's Lesbians: Neither Sex, nor
Reasonable, 25 CONN. L REv. 491, 494-95 (1993).
9. SARAH LUCIA HOAGLAND. LESBIAN ETHICS: TOWARD NEW VALUE 167-68 (1988). depicts
lesbian sexuality as subordinating the orgasm to a more diffuse eroticism.
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quent activity for women than it is for men, this is an important, and
plausibly a biologically programmed, difference.
The second claim of mine that Fineman questions is that capacity
for breast-feeding is positively correlated with size of breasts. She is
right to question it. 10 But it is a trivial aspect of the book's argument.
Last, she takes issue with my reference to the "common observation"
that homosexual men and heterosexual women are on average betterdressed than heterosexual men or homosexual women. Her objection is
not that my assertion is false but that it is not adequately documented.
If documentation is necessary, it is available."
10. This claim, also questioned by Hadfield, supra note 2, at 492 n.33, was based on a single
article and is probably incorrect. I am prepared to concede this point on the basis of a literature of
which I was unaware when I wrote Sex and Reason. See Joan M. Bedinghaus & Joy Melnikow,
PromotingSuccessful Breast-FeedingSkills, 45 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 1309, 1310 (1992); Barbara
K. Popper & Constance K. Culley, Breastfeeding Makes a Comeback-For Good Reason, 5
BROWN U. CHILD BEHAN. & DEV. LETTER, Feb. 1989, at 1.

11.

Under the heading "Clothing," in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA

OF HOMOSEXUALITY

246 (Wayne R.

Dynes ed., 1990), we read that "[g]ay men have often used clothing to indicate that they were
potential sexual partners for other males." The various types of "signal" clothing used by gay men
are then described. Lesbians receive only a brief paragraph, referring to their former preference
for "male formal dress" and to a more recent preference for "somewhat shapeless garments and
no makeup," although it is pointed out that "other gay women prefer more elegant dress, of which
there are several versions." Id. at 247. The best social-scientific treatise on fashion that I have
been able to find contains an index entry for "Gay males, dress of," but nothing concerning lesbians. SUSAN B. KAISER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF CLOTHING AND PERSONAL ADORNMENT 491
(1985). The Kaiser treatise supports another of my challenged sartorial points-that high heels
have a symbolic function, similar to that of Chinese foot-binding, of impeding female mobility.
Kaiser remarks that women's shoes are considered attractive only if they appear to be uncomfortable. Id. at 243. A subsequent version of Kaiser's book, SUSAN B. KAISER. THE SOCIAL PSYCIOLOGY OF CLOTHING: SYMBOLIC APPEARANCES IN CONTEXT

(1990), omits all reference to homosex-

uals' clothing choices, but retains the reference to uncomfortable shoes. Id. at 88. It would be odd,
of course, to describe male formal dress or shapeless garments as "sexy," yet "sexy" is a recognized category of both heterosexual women's clothing, Mary K. Ericksen & M. Joseph Sirgy,
Employed Females' Clothing Preference, Self-Image Congruence, and Career Anchorage, 22 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL 408, 411 (1992), and gay men's clothing. Cf.FRED DAVIS. FASHION,
CULTURE, AND IDENTITY 35 (1992). So I think the "fashion hierarchy" alleged in my book is
supported as well as plausible.
An alternative possibility, however, is that lesbians don't dress as well as heterosexual women
or homosexual men because they have lower incomes, on average, than either heterosexual women
or homosexual men. Men generally have higher incomes than women and many heterosexual
women are supported, in part anyway, by a man. Sex and Reason touches on the effect of income
on sex-related behavior (at pages 133-36), but the touch may be too light, as argued in Martha
Nussbaum, "Only Grey Matter"? Richard Posner's Cost-Benefit Analysis of Sex, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1689, 1726-28 (1992) (book review). Finally, if "better dressed" is thought to be hopelessly
vague for social scientific research, one can substitute fraction of income spent on clothing, cosmetics, and grooming, perhaps "normalized" by reference to the spending of heterosexual members of the same sex. So one might compare the ratio of lesbian/heterosexual-female spending on
clothing, etc., to the ratio of gay/heterosexual-male spending on clothing, etc.
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After this, words begin to fail Professor Fineman. She finds a pattern of "misogynistic conceptualization and thought patterns" 12 that
leaves her speechless. She is particularly dumbfounded by my statement that in very poor societies female infanticide may, by reducing
the number of adult women, increase the welfare of surviving females.
Bartlett makes the interesting and valid point that these survivors' welfare, broadly construed as it should be to include psychic as well as
material well-being, may be reduced by knowledge of the practice. Another valid feminist point is that girls may be too costly to raise, and
thus candidates for infanticide, only because the society refuses to allow women to do productive work. Fineman, however, does not question
the accuracy or completeness of my discussion of female infanticide on
these or other grounds. And I am grateful to her for not suggesting
that I favor female infanticide. The misogyny of which she accuses me
consists only in my remarking an unpleasant fact; to utter uncomfortable truths is, apparently, to be misogynistic. Similarly, although she
does not claim that I am incorrect in suggesting on the basis of economic analysis that most rape (more, even, were it not a criminal offense) is sex theft rather than a political statement about male domination, she implies (with no basis of which I am aware) that the economic
interpretation of rape has been employed to the end of advocating the
decriminalization of rape; so here, apparently, I have veered from uttering uncomfortable truths to uttering dangerous ones. In any event it
is an odd observation. No one proposes to decriminalize theft. Why
then would one suppose that characterizing rape as sex theft by emphasizing the economic commonality of the two crimes would arm the advocates of decriminalizing rape? Who are these advocates, anyway?
The trend is-quite the opposite. Rape-shield laws and the criminalization of marital rape are recent developments. I add that by referring to
rape as sex theft I do not deny its violent, and sometimes sadistic, character. Some forms of theft are crimes of violence and rape is one of
them. I deny only that rapists are, as it were, agents of the rest of the
adult male population appointed to keep women in a state of terrified
dependency.
Eventually, Fineman gives up completely on my book and instead
ventures to explain the allure of economic analysis. She concludes that
its appearance of detached, rational, scientific inquiry facilitates its use
in legitimating the status quo, ratifying existing inequities, and in par12.

Fineman, supra note 6, at 508.
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ticular furnishing spurious justifications for "patriarchy, classism,
heterosexism, and racism." 13 I do not see how Fineman could derive
such a conclusion from my book. The book is critical of restrictions on
abortion and contraception, of discrimination against gays and lesbians,
and of the institution of marriage, which I argue (and this should strike
a sympathetic chord with Fineman) is likely to give way increasingly to
contracts of cohabitation that, so far as I'm concerned, homosexuals
should be as entitled to make with each other as heterosexuals are. The
book also endorses feminist claims about the prevalence of child sexual
abuse (most of it of female children), defends the criminalization of
marital rape, and has many kind (though also some critical) words to
say about the egalitarian policies of Sweden. Obviously, I do not go all
the way with radical feminism, but neither do I endorse any social
practice fairly describable as patriarchal, classist, heterosexist, or
racist.
Robson
Robson announces in her commentary that she will not attempt to
refute any of my factual assertions (although she implies that she could
do so easily), because the very attempt would somehow endanger the
survival of lesbianism, and she describes her scholarly ambition in
frankly political terms, as "contribut[ing] toward the survival of lesbians, both as individuals and as identity."'14 She adds a twist to
Fineman's criticism of my suggestion that lesbians are on average'0 less
well-dressed than heterosexual females and homosexual males by seeming to be personally affronted by the suggestion. This puzzles me. I had
not thought vanity such an admired trait in our society that a group
judged deficient in it would feel disparaged if the "deficiency" were
pointed out. I should have thought that feminists would decry the social
pressure on women to dress attractively and applaud rather than deny
lesbians' defiance of that norm. I know that some feminists take umbrage when it is pointed out that female crime rates are much lower
than male; I do not understand that reaction either.
A number of assertions in Robson's paper baffle me, such as "the
13.

Id. at 512.

14. Robson, supra note 8, at 500-01.
15. I keep repeating this qualification, but it is important. Much discrimination arises from (or
induces) the erroneous belief that all members of a minority group have the characteristics of the
average member. In fact there is a distribution of characteristics around the mean, and thus there
can be great overlap between groups even if the means are different.
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'fact' of lesbians as 'not very sexual' may be perceived as a mandate, or
at least a reason, to regulate lesbian sexuality." 10 I thought on first
reading this passage that she might be making the not ridiculous point
that if lesbians (or simply all women) were believed "naturally" unsexual, then lesbian sex would seem all the more "unnatural." But the
passage will not bear that interpretation. I am equally perplexed by her
17
suggestion that I believe that lesbians "are not very reasonable."
(Later she says, equally without basis, that my analysis could be
thought to imply that lesbians are more rational than male homosexuals.) Rational behavior is behavior guided by costs and benefits,
broadly conceived. If a person has an intense sexual preference, the
benefit the person receives from acting in accordance with that preference may exceed the costs, even if those costs are high, whether because of social stigma, discrimination, or disease risk. 18 Even if the
preference is much less intense, even if a person is merely opportunistically homosexual, a homosexual act may, if opportunity beckons, be
substituted for a heterosexual one even if society disapproves of homosexuality. Incidentally, Robson's suggestion that ten percent of women
are lesbians is plainly exaggerated, perhaps by as much as an order of
magnitude. The ten percent figure that homosexual-rights advocates
have tried to convince the public is the true percentage of homosexuals,
male and female, is based on a questionable interpretation of Kinsey's
figure for male homosexuals, and is probably three times too high even
for males.1 9 It is a political statistic.
Robson makes in passing a point heavily emphasized by Bartlett
and Hadfield, that despite all my disclaimers my ostensibly economic
analysis depends on the truth of sociobiology. That is not so. It is true
that some of what I say about homosexuality depends upon my belief
that homosexual preference is largely or entirely innate, rather than
acquired as a result of personal choice, cultural influences, seduction,
advocacy, or rape. But nothing depends on whether it is innate because
a gene or complex of genes for homosexuality might somehow enhance
inclusive fitness or because some more or less regular percentage of
infants are born with or acquire in early infancy a neurological or psychological condition that will, when they reach sexual maturity, cause
16.

Robson, supra note 8, at 496.

17. Id. at 497.
18. Here it should be noted that the AIDS epidemic has reduced the cost of lesbian sex relative to heterosexual sex.
19.

POSNEP. supra note 1, at 294-95.
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them to be attracted to persons of the same sex. Indeed much of my
economic analysis of homosexuality, such as the analysis of homosexual
search costs mentioned by Bartlett, Hadfield, and Robson, and the
analysis of opportunistic or situational homosexuality, is completely independent of theories about the causes of homosexual preference. The
same is largely although not entirely true about my discussion of
women's sexuality. For example, it is a fact, whether or not it has a
genetic or a cultural explanation, that women generally have pursued a
more conservative sexual strategy than men; for the most part, that is
all that my analysis of the differences between male and female sexual
behavior requires.
Of course, if the reason for the more conservative strategy is cultural rather than biological, it may be-an economic reason, and an economic analysis that failed to explain the reason would be incomplete.
But most economic analysis is partial, and therefore incomplete, seeking to explain a part of the social world rather than the whole of it. Yet
in fact I do seek to explain the difference in male and female sexual
strategies in economic as well as biological terms, emphasizing the tendency of the strategies to converge when women's occupational profile
converges with men's, as in Sweden.
Bartlett
As just mentioned, far from arguing that men and women are
slaves to their genes in matters of sex, Sex and Reason emphasizes that
women's sexual strategy changes in the direction of the traditional
male strategy as women's occupational profile comes more to resemble
men's. Bartlett is therefore incorrect to say that it is crucial to my theory to regard men and women as subject not to social factors but only
to evolutionary forces.2" The opposite is true: it is crucial to my theory
(for example in Chapter Six, which is about the historical-not biological-evolution of sexual behavior) that human sexual behavior and mores have been shaped by economic forces and not merely by biological
ones, that is, by culture as well as by nature.
Bartlett nevertheless makes a number of good points, and in a
refreshingly civilized tone. I have already mentioned her point about
the possible psychological effects of a practice of female infanticide on
survivors whom the practice may make better off in a material sense.
She makes a related point about the possible psychological effects on
20.

Katharine T. Bartlett, Rumpelstiltskin, 25 CONN. L. REV. 473, 477-78 (1993).

HeinOnline -- 25 Conn. L. Rev. 524 1992-1993

ON SEX AND REASON

1993]

women and children of allowing a market in parental rights. She is also
right to observe that some men derive pleasure from thinking that they
belong to the superior or at least the dominant sex. And she is right to
point out that when I claim to be presenting a "nonmoral" or "morally
indifferent" conception of sex I am in fact presenting a conception
based on a specific morality, that of John Stuart Mill and other pragmatic libertarians. 21 The idea of a morality of morally indifferent sex is
not entirely oxymoronic, however. To regard sex as morally indifferent
is to regard it in the same light in which we (or most of us) regard
driving cars. Driving is a potentially dangerous activity, to self and to
others, but ethical and policy analysis of it is generally not encumbered
by taboos, stigmas, or appeals to nature or to the deity. Driving is recognized as useful, pleasurable, rational, and properly subject only to
limited constraints of law and social pressure. Purging (so far as possible) the moral charge from sex clears the way for the same sort of
"liberal," vaguely Millian approach to it that comes naturally when we
discuss morally indifferent subjects like driving, eating, and playing
bridge.
There are, however, a number of inaccurate or misleading statements in Bartlett's paper, and cumulatively they convey a distorted impression of my book. That my analysis depends on the truth of sociobiology is only one of these statements. It is also misleading to represent
me as concluding "that it is appropriate for society to withhold its endorsement of homosexual marriage and disfavor child custody by
homosexuals. 22 I discuss the pros and cons of homosexual marriage
without reaching a conclusion, and I conclude that homosexuals should
not be forbidden to have custody of children, that the best interests of
the child may sometimes be served by such custody, and that the matter should be considered on a case-by-case basis rather than governed
by blanket rules. I do not dismiss the moral objections to abortion or
suggest that they can be refuted by rational arguments; I suggest that
there are inconsistencies in them, but that beyond a point they cannot
be profitably discussed. I acknowledge that abortion cannot be rationally justified to an individual who "puts a high (if not the highest)
value on fetal life," 23 but I suggest (as Bartlett here momentarily forgets) that the opponents of abortion in fact do not place the highest
21. This point also is made by Nussbaum, supra note 11, at 1701-09, and by Hadfield. supra
note 2, at 489.
22. Bartlett, supra note 20, at 477.
23.

Id. at 482.
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value on fetal life. If they did they would have to oppose abortion even
when the mother's life was endangered, unless it was certain that she
would die unless her fetus was killed. And they do not.
24
My book does not argue that homosexuality is "undesirable.
But I should not have thought it necessary to give reasons for doubting
that a woman who says that "[d]aughters of lesbians, like freedom
fighters everywhere, need to be enlisted in infancy, and protected
against heterofemininity by words and actions," 25 is automatically to
be assumed a fit parent if her fitness is questioned in a custody contest.
I do not describe or define companionate marriage as marriage in
which "the wife must be made desirable (or here, 'companionable')
enough to keep him [her husband] .' 26 The passage on which Bartlett
bases this interpretation is an attempt not at describing companionate
marriage but at assessing the impact on it of access to effective contraception. Companionate marriage is described in other chapters. I do
not discount what Bartlett calls "irrational altruism" 27 (altruism not
based on an expectation of reciprocal favors) as a factor in sexual and
family behavior, or deride it as "naive." 2 8 Nor do I suggest (in contradiction to my supposed rejection of nonreciprocal altruism) that female
infanticide is based upon women's willingness to sacrifice themselves
for other women.
I do not consider it "soft and sentimental" to talk about "the welfare of others," but neither do I get much out of such a statement as
"the social conditions that perpetuate women's subservience to men are
unfair and should be changed. ' 29 Not many people nowadays defend
conditions "that perpetuate women's subservience to men." The problem is in defining "subservience," identifying the conditions that promote it, and designing appropriate means of eliminating it. We won't
get far with "a commitment to women's control over their reproductive
decisions . ..or to improving the quality of life for children who are

born," 0 if the commitment involves simultaneously urging the woman's
right to kill her child until the moment of birth3 1 and the child's right
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
POSNER, supra note 1, at 419.
Bartlett, supra note 20, at 483.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 490. Nor for that matter do I consider it irrational.
Id. at 489.

30. Id.
31. That may not be Bartlett's position. For all I know, she would restrict abortion when the
pregnancy is far advanced. But she does not indicate any such qualification of women's right to

"control over their reproductive decisions."
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to a high-quality life from the moment of birth forward. I do not say
that even so abrupt a discontinuity could not be defended, but Bartlett
disables herself from defending it by remarking a few sentences later
that "society benefits most when individuals fight rather than give in to
whatever tendencies they might have to think of themselves first."32
One might have supposed that many abortions resulted from women's
"tendencies to think of themselves first." Before Bartlett embraces selflessness as the beacon for social policy she may wish to ponder the
implications. Many feminists believe that one of the problems of
women is that they have been too selfless.
Hadfield
Professor Hadfield does not question the pertinence of economics
to the understanding of sexuality, but finds everywhere in my book "the
pitfalls of a male-centered vision of what sex is all about." 3 3 Hadfleld
offers few clues to what a proper economic analysis of sexuality would
look like, but I infer, despite some backpedaling in her surreply, that it
would treat the oppression of women as the central causal factor in
sexual attitudes and behavior. "[W]hat sex is all about," in her view,
appears to be male domination. She does not quite say this, but unless
she believes that I have overlooked the central fact about human sexuality, I cannot understand the dismissive tone of her review.
She observes correctly that I do not discuss all the potentially significant endogeneities in an economic analysis of sexuality.4 She is
right that the sexual practices of women not only are influenced by the
occupational choices of women, as I emphasized, but also influence
those choices. If women are sequestered in order to assure their virginity (before marriage) or their chastity (after), they will be deprived of
opportunities to work in the market. This is an overlooked point in my
analysis, but is it an important one? Women do not go out to work
because men stop sequestering them; men stop sequestering them because the opportunity cost of sequestration becomes prohibitive. It is
unclear to me whether Hadfield would disagree.
In like vein she argues that contraception is a function not only of
the cost and efficacy of contraceptive methods but also of a desire to
32.

Bartlett, supra note 20, at 490.

33.

Hadfield, supra note 2, at 502.

34. An endogenous factor, as distinct from an exogenous one, is affected by the variables in
the economic model, rather than just affecting them.
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limit family size and a taste for particular sexual practices, not all of
which are procreative. The first half of this proposition-that the desire
to limit family size can induce contraception even if the cost is high, as
it was before the invention of modern contraceptives-obviously is true,
is indeed a commonplace in the literature on fertility, and is remarked
upon in the book. I made clear that contraception must be understood
broadly to include nontechnological methods of avoiding pregnancy
such as coitus interruptus, occasional abstinence, and the various forms
of nonvaginal intercourse, such as oral and anal intercourse. 3 It is true
that when I wrote about how the fall in the full price of contraception
has facilitated women's liberation from the household, I disregarded
the possibility that this liberation would have occurred earlier if people
had different preferences regarding contraceptive sexual practices such
as oral intercourse. The possibility is of limited significance, given the
strong preference, probably genetic, on the part of most men and
women for vaginal intercourse. Other elements of endogeneity in the
market for contraceptives are more important: the advent of the contraceptive pill lowered the cost of premarital sex and therefore increased
the demand for it, but higher demand for premarital sex was also a
factor in increasing the demand for the pill. I freely grant that much
more can be done with the economics of contraception than I attempted to do in Sex and Reason. 8
Hadfield criticizes me for ignoring the social organization of child
care, but that subject is in fact central to my discussion of the evolution
of sexual morality in Chapter Six. And in attributing to me the belief
that all women in ancient Greece were regarded merely as breeders,
she neglects (as should have been obvious from the context) that I was
discussing women of the citizen class, who were not permitted to work.
Elsewhere the book emphasizes the productivity of women in traditional agricultural societies and discusses the impact of that productivity on sexual mores.3 7 Hadfield makes some of the oddest claims, specifically, that I slight women by having an index entry for women but
not for men, and by devoting more space to male homosexuality than to
lesbianism, and that I give "disproportionate" attention to male homosexuality38 relative to female sexuality (the disproportion consisting, I
35.

POSNER, supra note 1, at 151, 267, 270.

36. See TOMAS J. PHILIPSON & RICHARD A. POSNER, PRIVATE CHOICES AND PUBLIC HEALTI1:
THE AIDS EPIDEMIC IN AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, Ch. 9 (forthcoming 1993).
37.
38.

POSNER, supra note 1, at 129, 170.
Hadfield, supra note 2, at 485 n.16, 490-91. "Posner seems to believe that the central
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suppose, in the fact there are so many more women than there are male
homosexuals). She should want someone afflicted with "male-centered
vision" to confine himself to analyzing relations between males. But it
is not true that in my analysis women are merely objects, and not subjects. Hadfield ignores most of my discussion of women and, while
pouncing on me for acknowledging that I did not attempt a systematic
economic analysis of prostitution, ignores the dozens of index entries
under "Prostitution." What is correct is that because men (apparently
in all societies) are more promiscuous than women, women do not incur
search costs for sex (streetwalkers are an exception), unless expenditures on enhancing attractiveness, broadly understood, are counted.
Putting to one side that important qualification, not remarked by Hadfield, an analysis that focuses on search costs because they are one of
the less intractable issues in the nascent economic analysis of sex is
bound to seem preoccupied with male behavior. Also, we can learn a lot
about heterosexuality by studying relationships in which the "hetero"
element is missing. Male homosexual relationships can teach us a lot
about what women bring to a relationship, and lesbian relationships
can teach us a lot about what men bring to a relationship.
Like Fineman and Bartlett, Hadfield mistakenly believes that biology is the linchpin of my analysis.3 9 The mistake is puzzling in view of
her complaint that I devote too much space to male homosexuality, for,
as I noted earlier, my theoretical analysis of homosexuality (as distinct
from my policy advice) is completely independent of whether it has a
genetic basis. She undermines the credibility of her own discussion of
the biology of sex by confessing, without explaining, her skepticism
about biological explanations of human behavior 40 She seems irritated
at the suggestion that women have on average a less overmastering
lust, a less intense sexual itch, than men. Why that should be irritating
is mysterious to me. As a prop of the ideology of women's natural subordination to men, the palpably erroneous belief that women are
greater slaves to their sexual desire than men has alternated with the
equally erroneous belief that normal women lack any sexual desire at
all.

41

phenomenon for which a theory of sexuality must account is the choice of a man's anus from the
range of available options" Id. at 490.
39. "To stop at biology is never really to have started." Id. at 499.
40. Id. at 489-90.
41.

See, e.g., THOMAS LAQUEUR. MAKING SEX: BODY AND GENDER FROM TIE GREEKS TO

FREUD 3-4, 189-92 (1990). Hadfield appears to endorse the view that I equate lesser sex drive
with no sex drive, so that "Posners excision of female sexuality from his analysis renders sexual
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Hadfield gives a misleading impression of my conception of the
evolutionary biology of human sexuality-making my views sound like
a mindless celebration of male promiscuity-by using ellipses and by
failing to mention my discussion of the costs of that promiscuity. The
point she taxes me with omitting-that the larger the optimal paternal
investment in child rearing the more costly a promiscuous sexual strategy is for a man-is actually one that I emphasize. 42 And not only in
my discussion of the biology of sex. It is fundamental to my discussions
of polygamy and of companionate marriage (Chapters Six and Nine).
Toward the end of Hadfield's review, the cause of her fixation on
the biological aspects of my analysis and her emphasis on an esoteric
point, the endogeneity of contraception, becomes clearer. She believes
that biology and technology are the building blocks with which I construct an alternative explanation to male domination for the relative
positions of men and women throughout history, and today. She thinks,
not without reason, that I believe that biology, including male sex drive
and paternity anxiety, and the high level of child mortality in a society
without knowledge of modern medicine and hygiene, goes far to explain
the extraordinary subordination of women in many ancient and primitive societies, and that technology, including improvements in medicine
and hygiene that greatly reduced infant mortality, in household laborsaving devices, in contraception, and in job opportunities for women,
has enabled women in modern Western societies to progress toward full
social, political, economic, and sexual equality with men. She appears
to consider male power, violence, and exploitativeness more important
factors than biology and technology in the history of women and female sexuality. (Does the possibility that women's liberation from their
traditional subordination to men is due primarily to technological advancements made by men rankle so?) She thus views rape as a method
of male domination.
A theory of human sexuality that stresses male power and violence
is an arguable alternative to my theory and if she had said that I
should have given it more attention I could but plead limitations of
space, the difficulty of fitting the theory to the standard economic
model of human behavior, the theory's implausibility, and the counterlove between women logically impossible." Hadfield, supra note 2, at 491 n.29 (citing-with what
had seemed to me apparent approval, though her surreply denies this-Martha Ertman, Denying
the Secret of Joy: Book Review of Sex and Reason 1-3 (Sept. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on
file at the Harvard Law School Library)).
42. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 1,at 95.
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evidence that I marshaled and that she ignores.4 Instead she has said,
in effect, that anyone who does not see the social dimensions of human
sexuality primarily in terms of a power struggle between men and
women is a fool-or a man.

43. Most strikingly, the evidence of female subordination is far greatcr in societies with little
rape or pornography or both than in the United States. See POSNER, supra note 1, chs. 13, 14.
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